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A CONCEPTUAL DISASTER ZONE INDEED: THE 
INCOHERENCE OF THE STATE AND THE NEED  
FOR STATE ACTION DOCTRINE(S) 
BROOKES BROWN∗ 
The state action doctrine is famously a disaster zone.  In this Paper, I 
will argue that the doctrine’s problems have an unexpected source: there is 
no such thing as the state.  In saying this, I mean nothing spookily meta-
physical.  Police exist, legislators exist, courts exist, laws exist, and so on.  
But the concept of the state is itself incoherent.  Our core intuitions about 
what it is to be a state are in conflict. 
The appropriate response might seem to be that defended by several 
recent authors: give up on the doctrine altogether. I however, maintain the 
opposite: recognizing this incoherence allows us to rescue the doctrine.  
Upon reflection, our interest in the state reveals itself as an interest in sever-
al different clusters of features, each of which prove independently coherent 
and morally significant.  This suggests a new way of understanding the doc-
trine that can overcome existing criticisms.  Rather than attempting to save 
the state action doctrine, we need to develop a pluralistic set of state action 
doctrines, clarifying when we have reason to attend to each of these traits. 
I.  THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
First, we need to get a sense of the problem.  To that end, I will start 
by giving a brief overview of the state action doctrine before detailing why 
so many critics find this framework unacceptable. 
The Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in the “Civil Rights 
Cases,” a group of lawsuits brought in response to the Civil Rights Act of 
1875.1  The Act barred inns, public conveyances, theaters, or places of pub-
lic amusement from forbidding entry to people on the basis of race, color, 
or previous status as a slave.2  In 1883, the Court found this restriction un-
constitutional on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give 
Congress the right to regulate private entities.3  Because the Amendment 
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 1.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  “The Civil Rights Cases” consist of five cas-
es (ultimately consolidated) in which black citizens were denied access to white-only facilities 
(United States v. Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States v. Single-
ton, and Robinson v. Memphis & Charleston R.R. Co.).  
 2. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).  
 3.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 15. 
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forbids states from abridging the privileges and immunities of citizenship, 
Section Five (the “enforcement provision”) is limited in scope, granting 
Congress the right to enforce this requirement only against state actors, not 
private individuals or associations.4  State actors can thus be found to vio-
late the Constitution in a way private actors cannot. 
This naturally raises the question, “who counts as a state actor?”  If 
state and non-state actors are to be held to different legal standards, we need 
to know who falls into each category. 
It is here where courts run into trouble.  Those unfamiliar with the doc-
trine might think the task of identifying state actors relatively simple.  After 
all, most of us move through the world relatively confident in our assess-
ment of who does and does not constitute a government agent.  Those more 
familiar with the doctrine will find this laughable.  Far from being non-
controversial, the state action doctrine is notoriously confused and contest-
ed.  Generations of law professors and lawyers have struggled to make 
sense of the relevant jurisprudence with no real success.  Charles Black fa-
mously noted that the courts’ approach to the issue resembles “a torchless 
search for a way out of a damp echoing cave.”5  Laurence Tribe has de-
clared the doctrine to be in a state of bankruptcy.6  Even the lightest perusal 
of literature on the subject turns up sentences like, “[t]he state action doc-
trine is slowly descending into utter confusion,”7 “the state action doctrine 
[is] one of the most complex and discordant doctrines in American juris-
prudence,”8 or, as Daniel Gifford more gently describes, the “case law ex-
hibits a remarkable lack of coherence.”9 
We can divide the most prevalent criticisms of the doctrine into three 
categories: that the doctrine is unintelligible, purposeless, and meaningless. 
A.  Unintelligible 
Many argue the jurisprudence is unintelligible.  Justice Souter put the 
point rather delicately when he wrote that, “no one fact can function as a 
                                                          
 4.  Id. at 13.  The case remains good law to this day.  For example, similar analysis explains 
the Supreme Court’s refusal to uphold parts of the Violence Against Women Act.  United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  However, courts have permitted Congress to enforce bans against 
discrimination in public accommodations by expansively interpreting the Commerce Clause.  
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that the Commerce 
Clause could be used to force private businesses to satisfy the Civil Rights Act of 1964).  
 5.  Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: ‘State Action,’ Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). 
 6.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1149 (1978). 
 7.  Julie Brown, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 
581 (2008).  
 8.  Developments in the Law, State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1248, 1250 (2010). 
 9.  Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: 
Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1229 n.5 (1995). 
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necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set 
of circumstances absolutely sufficient.”10  The number of tests used by 
courts to identify state actors has ballooned—counts of five, six, or seven 
are common.11  There appears to be no stable set of features we can rely on 
to assess whether a given entity counts as part of the state.  As Christian 
Turner writes, “it is unclear which facts truly matter, how much they matter, 
or why they matter.”12  To be of any use, the doctrine must be simplified.  
Yet courts have reached little agreement as to what kinds of facts are rele-
vant to such an assessment.13  Indeed, a workable method of identifying 
state actors has been called the “Holy Grail that has eluded state action the-
orists for decades.”14 
B.  Purposeless 
Others challenge the purpose of the doctrine.  Why draw this distinc-
tion?  Why should it be legal for a person to discriminate on racial grounds 
in selling her home, but illegal for a judge to enforce the exact same restric-
tive covenant—as the Supreme Court famously found in Shelley v. Kra-
mer?15  These critics contend that state and non-state actors have the same 
moral standing.16  Consequently, the effort to distinguish these actors is 
misguided.  Even if we could find a workable test, the distinction would 
have no normative significance.  Rather than attempting to identify state ac-
tors, we should be looking for other traits whose presence or absence actu-
ally makes a moral difference.  Charles Black, for example, declares of the 
state action doctrine that, “[t]o state a criterion is not to ensure that it will 
draw a useful line.”17  He further notes that, “[m]ost constructive sugges-
                                                          
 10.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). 
 11.  See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (recognizing that the 
Court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts and leaving open 
the question whether these are actually different in operation); see also John Dorsett Niles, Lauren 
E. Tribble & Jennifer N. Wimsatt, Making Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 
886 (2011) (acknowledging that the court has considered the problem of finding a meaningful dis-
tinction between state and private action “more than seventy times”). 
 12.  Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FL. L. REV. 281, 290 (2013). 
 13.  For examples of courts relying on different sets of facts, see Tulsa Professional Collec-
tion Services Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (determining whether agents receive governmental 
benefits); Sniadach v. Family Finance Court, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (considering whether agents 
receive overt assistance from state officials); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (assessing 
whether a private action is intertwined with governmental policies).   
 14.  Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to State Action Determina-
tions: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 69 GEO. L.J. 745, 769 (1981). 
 15.  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 16.  See, e.g., Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923). 
 17.  Black, supra note 5, at 100. 
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tions come down, one way or another, to the suggestion that attention shift 
from the inquiry after ‘state action’ to some other inquiry altogether.”18 
C.  Meaningless 
Finally, many scholars contend there is no meaningful distinction be-
tween so-called state and so-called non-state actors.  Following in the steps 
of Robert Hale, such critics argue there are no actions that can properly be 
termed private, as all so-called private actions are possible only because so-
called state actors permit them.19  Mark Tushnet, for example, writes that, 
“[t]he state action doctrine is analytically incoherent . . . .  There is no re-
gion of social life that even conceptually can be marked off as ‘pri-
vate’ . . . .”20  In a similar vein, Cass Sunstein concludes that state action is 
always present.  “Suppose,” he writes, “that an employer refuses to hire 
women . . . .  If an employer . . . is being allowed to do so, it is not because 
nature has decreed anything.  It is because the law has allocated the relevant 
rights to the employer.”21  Since there are no non-state actions, there is no 
point attempting to distinguish state from non-state actors.  The latter cate-
gory will simply be empty. 
These criticisms set the standard for the rest of our discussion.  On 
these grounds, many legal scholars have argued that we should abandon the 
state action doctrine.22  At best, the doctrine creates confusion; at worst it 
leads us to systematically overlook civil rights violations.  Any successful 
defense of the doctrine must answer these concerns: proving that we can 
develop workable tests for identifying state actors, showing that there are 
meaningfully distinct individuals and institutions that qualify as state and 
non-state actors, and—most importantly—exhibiting principled reasons as 
to why we should hold such actors to different legal standards. 
II.  THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM: OUR INCOHERENT STATE 
Contra critics like those just described, I will defend the state action 
doctrine.  I believe that there is value to identifying state actors, and that 
this can be meaningfully and workably accomplished.  Unlike recent at-
tempts to respond to the above criticisms, however, I do not think we can 
rescue the doctrine merely by simplifying the tests courts use to identify 
                                                          
 18.  Id. at 95. 
 19.  See, e.g., Garry Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 
GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, State Action Is Always Present, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
465, 467 (2002). 
 20.  See Peller & Tushnet supra note 19, at 789. 
 21.  Sunstein, supra note 19, at 467. 
 22.  See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, State Action in 2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 69, 69–
77 (Jack M. Balkin & Riva Siegel eds., 2009) (arguing that the state action doctrine is misleading, 
and should be abandoned). 
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state actors, or by locating a singular principle to explain the unique signifi-
cance of such actors.23  Instead, I think answering these challenges requires 
radically revising how we think about the doctrine and the entity it tracks. 
The issue, loosely, is that existing attempts to untangle the confusion 
surrounding the state action doctrine begin with the sense that we can—and 
should—first work out the essence of what it is to be a state, and then find a 
feasible way of identifying the relevant actors and a principle that explains 
why they should be held to special constitutional requirements.  The prob-
lem is that this will never work.  There is a simple—if unexpected—
explanation for the confusion that pervades discussions of the state action 
doctrine: our concept of the state is incoherent.  Without noticing, we have 
clung to three different and mutually incompatible notions of states’ fun-
damental nature.  Consequently, there is no unequivocal thing that it is to be 
a state.  In looking for the state, we have been seeking something that does 
not exist. 
The hope for a way out of our jurisprudential morass lies in recogniz-
ing this incoherence.  However, first I must clarify what I mean when I de-
clare the concept of the state incoherent.  My claim is that our notion of the 
public realm is practically incoherent.  This is a cousin to logical incoher-
ence.  Logical incoherence occurs when two propositions contradict by def-
inition.  For example, you cannot both be married, and be a bachelor.  What 
it means to be a bachelor is that you are not married.  Practical incoherence, 
in contrast, occurs when two propositions are compatible as a matter of log-
ic, but cannot, in practice, describe the same subject.  For example, a desert 
whale—a whale that can eat only desert-growing cacti—is incoherent in 
this way.  Such a thing seems possible as a matter of definition, but any an-
imal that meets the first standard (being a whale) will not satisfy the second 
(eating only cacti) since desert plants do not grow in the ocean.  Unlike a 
married bachelor, talk of such a thing is possible, but it remains senseless 
except in imaginative storytelling.  
This is what I argue is true of the state.  Our intuitions about the fea-
tures an entity must possess to qualify as a state cannot coexist in practice.  
Like the idea of a marine mammal and the notion of an animal that must eat 
desert plants, these intuitions point to incompatible features.  Consequently, 
we find ourselves deeply confused when we go looking for state actors.  
Depending on which intuition attracts our cognitive attention, we will reach 
                                                          
 23.  See Brown, supra note 7; see also Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action 
Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2010) (arguing that we can make sense of the state 
action doctrine by concluding that state actors are those who act on behalf of other people, in con-
trast with private actors who act on their own behalf); Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine 
and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379 (2006) (contending that the 
state action doctrine can be understood as protecting the principle of democratic choice); Julie 
Brown, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561 (2008) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court should simplify and clarify the tests it uses to distinguish state actors). 
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different answers about what makes an entity part of the state, and thus 
about which individuals and institutions count as state actors. 
To demonstrate this, I need to tease out our intuitions about what it is 
to be a state, and then show that these intuitions are incompatible.  It is to 
the first of these tasks to which I will now turn. 
A.  What Do We Believe States to Be? 
What courts believe states to be does not tell us what these entities re-
ally are.  Nonetheless, it is a useful starting point for such conceptual anal-
yses.  In their efforts to identify state actors, lawyers and judges are forced 
to consider a variety of possible situations.  In the process, they reveal 
widely held intuitions about the nature of states.  Looking at how courts un-
derstand the state thus helps us clarify what ordinary users mean by the 
term.24 
We can group the tests courts use to identify state actors into roughly 
three categories: entanglement, public function, and traditional government 
actor.  Each exposes a broadly held belief about the nature of the state. 
1.  Entanglement Tests 
Entanglement tests focus on the connections between actors.25  Ac-
cording to these tests, an individual qualifies as a state actor if her behavior 
is properly attributed to a government agent.  The idea is that an act still 
counts as a government action if the government directs somebody else to 
do the task, just as you still bear responsibility for a murder if you hire a hit 
man. 
Courts have looked to many different factors to assess the existence of 
this relationship.  Included in this category, for example, are “entwinement 
tests” assessing how closely the government is connected to a group’s man-
agement or control,26 “nexus tests” analyzing whether there is a close 
enough link between the state and the entity such that the “action of the lat-
ter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself,”27 “state compulsion 
tests” examining the degree to which the state exercises coercive power 
                                                          
 24.  See generally FRANK JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENSE OF 
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (1998) (arguing that conceptual analysis typically proceeds by canvasing 
intuitions about possible cases to see what ordinary users find central about a given kind of thing).  
 25.  See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 300 
(2001) (suggesting that it is the closeness of the relationship between a potential surrogate associa-
tion and public officials that determines the organization’s qualification as a state agent). 
 26.  Id. at 288 (holding that a sports association counts as a state actor because it is entangled 
with state action).  
 27.  Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that a community men-
tal health center was not a state actor).  
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over the choice of a purportedly private organization,28 and “symbiotic rela-
tionship tests” considering the level of interdependence between an entity 
and the state.29  Judges have relied on a wide range of information to make 
these assessments, including (but not limited to): the extent to which the 
people or institutions in question receive government benefits,30 whether 
they receive overt assistance from state officials,31 whether they are imbued 
with the capacity to undertake actions traditionally associated with the state 
such as the “power to subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or 
to assert sovereign authority over any individual,”32 whether a purportedly 
private action is “intertwined with governmental policies,”33 and whether 
the state has provided a great deal of “encouragement, either overt or cov-
ert” for the entity’s actions.34 
Underlying these tests is a sense that the state is an organization that 
can be treated as a collective agent.  As such, it has a clear decisionmaking 
process that organizes and manages how its parts behave.  Specific individ-
uals and institutions owe their status as state actors to the fact that their ac-
tions embody the choices of that decisionmaking process, not of their own 
independent decisions.  They fail to qualify as state actors when their be-
havior cannot be traced back to this source, instead reflecting their own au-
tonomous decisionmaking. 
We see this intuition at play when, for example, we accept the meta-
phor of the state as a body, commanded by the head—the sovereign—who 
directs how the body will behave.  This view was popularized by Thomas 
Hobbes, who famously wrote, “by Art is created that great Leviathan called 
a Common-wealth, or . . . State . . . which is but an Artificial[] Man; though 
of greater stature and strength than the Natural[] . . . in which, the Sover-
eignty is an Artificial[] Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.”35  
The same intuition is in play when we feel inclined to hold the state respon-
sible for what is done by military contractors, but not the mafia, on the 
                                                          
 28.  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding a nursing home did not count as a state 
actor).  
 29.  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding that a coffee shop 
counted as a state actor because of a close symbiosis between the shop and government). 
 30.  Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (finding a collection 
agency connected to a hospital to count as a state actor).  
 31.  Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
 32.  NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988) (holding that the NCAA does not consti-
tute a state actor).  
 33.  Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (finding that operating a park is a public 
function).  
 34.  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) 
(quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).  
 35.  THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 9 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University Press 1991) 
(1651). 
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grounds that the former’s—but not the latter’s—behavior can be properly 
attributed to legislators’ decisions. 
2.  Public Function Tests 
Public function tests identify state actors by the actions they perform 
and the powers they wield.36  The most famous case decided under this ru-
bric is Marsh v. Alabama.37  The case involved a corporation, Gulf Ship-
building, that forbade a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing literature on a 
sidewalk owned by the company.38  Gulf claimed that, as a private corpora-
tion, it had a right to prohibit such actions on its property.39  The Court dis-
agreed.  Because the company owned and operated all the sidewalks and 
streets in the city, employed a police officer, and provided the usual accou-
terments of town life, the Court found that the corporation functioned as a 
municipality.40  As such it was subject to First Amendment requirements, 
and thus forbidden from imposing such restrictions on the distribution of 
information.41  Courts have used similar reasoning to classify individuals 
and organizations who perform a wide variety of services as state actors, 
including, to name but a few, people who make peremptory challenges dur-
ing jury selection, organizations that provide medical care in prisons, 
groups that provide transportation, as well as people who oversee parks, 
take custody of neglected children, or manage libraries.42 
                                                          
 36.  Robert Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 464 F. Supp. 288, 298 (1979) (not-
ing that, “the public function test turns on the nature of the power actually exercised”). 
 37.  326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 38.  Id. at 502. 
 39.  Id. at 503. 
 40.  Id. at 507.  
 41.  Id. at 508.  The Court found that the corporation qualified as a state actor because its ac-
tions had the same impact on the interests of the affected citizens.  Justice Black wrote that the 
citizens of the company town, “just like the citizens of towns that are not privately owned and op-
erated . . . must make decisions which affect the welfare of the community and nation.  To act as 
good citizens, they must be informed.  In order to enable them to be properly informed, their in-
formation must be uncensored.”  Id. 
 42.  See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (finding that private physicians under contract to 
provide prisoners with medical care constitute state actors as part of the state’s standing obligation 
to provide medical care to prisoners); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) 
(finding lawyers who make peremptory challenges to prospective jurors in civil trials to be state 
actors on the grounds that shaping the body that administers justice is a quintessentially state pow-
er); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (finding the trustees of a park to be state actors on the 
grounds that the park was an integral part of the city’s activities, that parks were necessary to 
maintain the public domain, and that citizens needed places to recreate free from the constraints 
private actors place on their property); Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding 
that private hospitals who provided health services to neglected children are subject to Section 
1983 claims because the provision of care to abandoned and neglected children is a clearly public 
function); Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that a corporation 
operating a library under contract with the city was performing a public function because there is a 
public interest in an informed citizenry).  
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These tests are animated by the sense that the state serves a particular 
role.  What makes an entity a state is the fact that it wields a special sort of 
control over the lives of those subject to its power, or plays a distinct part in 
the provision of significant resources.  An entity qualifies as a state actor if 
it performs the role of government, just as a woman who raises a child qual-
ifies as a mother by performing the role of mother, regardless of whether 
the child is her genetic offspring. 
It should be obvious that this view of the state is widely shared.  For 
evidence, you need only look as far as the most famous definition of a state: 
Weber’s declaration that “[t]he state is the human community that, within a 
defined territory . . . (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate force 
for itself.”43  Social scientists and the general public endorse this sense of 
the state when they assume a given region contains a failed state if it no 
longer possesses institutions with the ability to control the use of force or to 
provide public services.44  The implicit assumption is that the ability to do 
these things is what distinguishes a state from other kinds of entities. 
3.  Traditional State Actor Tests 
Finally, the traditional state actor test identifies individuals or institu-
tions as state actors on the grounds that they occupy roles long associated 
with the state.  For example, in Shelley v. Kramer, the Supreme Court found 
that judges count as state actors even when enforcing private contracts, 
holding “[t]hat the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official 
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has long been established by 
decisions of this Court.”45 
This test reflects a broadly shared sense that particular actors—police 
officers, magistrates, post office employees—represent the state, and oth-
ers—Catholic schoolteachers, advertising executives, Uber drivers—do not.  
This intuition about the nature of the state frequently presents as basic intui-
tion.  Though strongly held, those who express this intuition often suggest 
no further theory about what—if anything—unifies these positions.  The 
implication is that this feature is a base fact, uniformly held, about the state.  
Any taxonomy that does not place these actors in the right categories will 
be prima facie inaccurate.  Lillian BeVier and John Harrison capture this 
phenomenon nicely:   
                                                          
 43.  MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in MAX WEBER’S COMPLETE WRITINGS ON 
ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL VOCATIONS 156 (John Dreijmanis ed., Gordon C. Wells, trans., 2008) 
(emphasis added).  
 44.  See, e.g., Jean-Germain Gros, Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World 
Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti, 17 THIRD WORLD Q. 455 (1996). 
 45.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948).  
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 All participants in the debate over state action appear to assume 
that there are institutions for collectively organized coercion, such 
as police forces and armies, and institutions that make primary 
decisions about how that force is to be used. . . . All also seem to 
assume that there are unproblematically private persons to whom 
state power can in a sense be delegated through the creation of 
private rights that will be coercively enforced.  Core examples of 
the latter include individuals as well as artificial persons with le-
gal personality, such as corporations.46 
To see this intuition in play, you need only ask your friends or family mem-
bers who is part of the state and who is not. 
Collectively, these tests capture our three strongest intuitions about the 
nature of the state:  the state (1) is an organization, (2) governs, that is to 
say, it wields the power to control social outcomes, and (3) consists of those 
who occupy certain offices (like elected officials and judges acting in their 
official capacities), but not others (like corporate CEOs and private school-
teachers). 
B.  What Are Political Institutions Actually Like? 
These intuitions are practically incoherent.  These propositions do 
not—and realistically cannot—describe the same subject.  The set of indi-
viduals and institutions that count as an organization are inconsistent with 
the group of actors who take up the role of governing, and both in turn are 
at variance with the people who occupy traditionally recognized offices.  
What it takes to be an organization is incompatible with what is required to 
govern effectively, and neither intuition can be reconciled with our first-
order intuitions about state offices.  Consequently, our convictions about 
the state are in tension.  We cannot find an intelligible, meaningful, and 
purposeful way of identifying state actors because our intuitions about what 
a “state” is point us in different directions. 
To see this, we need only consider who qualifies as part of the state 
according to each of our intuitions about the concept’s nature.  As we will 
see, what it takes to make one intuition about the state true makes the others 
false.  These intuitions thus produce divergent answers, simultaneously tell-
ing us that particular individuals are—and are not—part of the state.  The 
concept itself is incoherent. 
1.  The State-as-Organization Is Not the State-as-Office 
Let’s begin with the first and third of the intuitions described above: 
our sense that the state is an organization, and that it consists of traditional 
                                                          
 46.  BeVier & Harrison, supra note 23, at 1802.  
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offices.  As legal scholars should find unsurprising, these visions of the 
state prove inconsistent. 
The problem stems from what an entity must be like to constitute an 
organization.  A necessary feature of an organization is that its members’ 
behaviors and relations are structured, managed, and controlled, such that 
their actions can be attributed back to the same decisionmaking process.47  
Such entities have a coordinated decisionmaking process that exercises ef-
fective command over how members behave, allowing the organization it-
self—qua collective entity—to deliberate about how it behaves and control 
its actions, and ensure that the members align with its intentions.  This dis-
tinguishes the members of an organization both from a mere mob or group 
of people, and from the members of two or more distinct organizations. 
The issue is the kind of control a particular decisionmaking process 
must have over an individual or institution for that actor to count as part of 
the organization in question.  There is no way to understand the control that 
underlies our intuitions about what offices constitute the state.  Thus, if the 
state is an organization—as intuition (1) above holds—it cannot also consist 
uniquely of traditional offices—as intuition (3) requires. 
To see this, let us consider two actors, one of which counts as a tradi-
tional state actor, and one of which does not: the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), and a barista in a coffee shop.  As a rulemaking agency, 
the former easily holds a position traditionally associated with the state.48  
The latter, however, does not.  It is hard to imagine a survey on the street 
would discover many people who think that coffee shop employees occupy 
offices of the state. 
There are two ways we might understand the power a centralized deci-
sionmaking process must exercise over a person or institution for the lat-
ter’s actions to count as those of the organization, and not the person’s au-
tonomous decision or that of another organization.  Neither reaches the 
right conclusions for our purposes.  Read one way, agencies like the EPA 
will not qualify as state actors.  Read another, baristas will.  Either way, our 
intuitions prove inconsistent. 
If we adopt a strong reading, an individual’s behavior counts as that of 
an organization only when it clearly instantiates the results of the deci-
sionmaking process thought to unify all the members.  In the context of the 
state, this reading means that a person’s actions count as state actions only 
when her intention to act can be traced in lineage to lawmakers.  This is 
                                                          
 47.  See PETER FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); CHRISTIAN 
LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY (2007) (arguing that groups must have a defined organiza-
tional structure to count as a group agent).  
 48.  See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975) (acknowledging that rule-
making agencies are state actors, though finding the issue inapplicable to the facts of the case); see 
also Food and Water Watch v. Environmental Protection Agency Civil Action No. 2012-1639 
(2013) (referring to the EPA in a way that recognizes it as an acknowledged state actor). 
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what we saw courts attempting to assess in the context of the entanglement 
test.49  We see just this kind of standard, for example, in the courts’ ap-
proach to the state action immunity doctrine.  In California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., the Court found that an act in re-
straint of trade received the immunity from anti-trust violations granted to 
state actors only if it was (1) clearly articulated and affirmed as state policy 
and (2) the state actively supervised the implementation of the policy.50 
These dual requirements ensure that entities count as agents of the state on-
ly when they are clearly acting to instantiate lawmakers’ decisions. 
The problem is that by this standard, rulemaking agencies like the EPA 
would not qualify as state actors.  Lawmakers rarely affirmatively express 
the policies these agencies enact, and they routinely fail to actively super-
vise agency choices or policy implementation.51  Consequently, if we adopt 
this high standard, agencies like the EPA do not count as part of the state 
according to intuition (1).  They enjoy too much autonomous decisionmak-
ing capacity to qualify as simply a member of one broader organization. 
Perhaps you dispute this.  Agencies, you might think, appear to have 
discretion.  But in fact, their choices reflect lawmakers’ will.  These offi-
cials simply wish them to behave as the agencies do.  Those inclined to this 
argument should recall the limitations of the nondelegation doctrine.  Ac-
cording to this doctrine, legislators are forbidden to delegate regulatory 
power without providing an intelligible principle to direct agency behavior.  
If legislators did so, agencies would qualify by our standard.  But legislators 
do no such thing.52  As anybody familiar with the doctrine will recognize, 
courts permit legislators to delegate regulatory power with only the barest 
of guidelines or directives—so much so that legal scholars have declared 
the nondelegation doctrine to be “a constitutional lost cause.”53  What is 
important for our purposes is not just that legislators do not issue guiding 
directives or actively supervise agency behavior, but why they fail to do so.  
                                                          
 49. See Part II.A.1. 
 50.  445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (holding that a wine pricing system authorized by California 
statute constituted resale price maintenance in violation of antitrust laws on the grounds that while 
legislators clearly authorized price setting, they did not actively supervise the system). 
 51.  See Matthew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrol v. Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. (1984) (accepting that Congress does not exer-
cise active oversight over agencies and attempting to argue that legislators might nonetheless in-
fluence how agencies behave more indirectly). 
 52.  Richard Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control over the ‘Hard-Look,’ 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1125, 1131 (2004) (“As the ill-health of the non-delegation doctrine demonstrates, the sepa-
ration-of-powers requirement that law place substantial constraints on the scope of executive dis-
cretion is for the most part honored in name but not in practice.  This state of affairs came to pass 
for good reasons.  Vast delegations often make policy sense—many people think it is an excellent 
thing for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to have broad authority to clean up the en-
vironment, for example.”).  
 53.  Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 88 
(2010). 
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The answer is that they cannot.  They lack the knowledge, expertise, atten-
tion span, or resources to engage in this kind of management.54  As Justice 
Blackmun wrote, “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”55 
Work in empirical political science bears this out.  Though scholars 
dispute the details, researchers typically agree that asymmetries in infor-
mation and expertise—as well as natural limits on the scope of attention—
make it impossible for lawmakers to meaningfully supervise agency policy 
choices in any active sense.56  The same limitations that make ex-ante direc-
tion functionally impossible make ex-post oversight unduly challenging.  
This is not to say that lawmakers exercise no influence over the behavior of 
administrative agencies, or that they lack the capacity to override these de-
cisions in particular instances.  Such a claim would be silly.  My point is 
only that lawmakers do not have the ability to meaningfully supervise or 
command most of the agency’s decisions at any given moment.  Conse-
quently, these groups typically operate with a high degree of autonomous 
decisionmaking capacity.57  In these cases, their decisions are best under-
stood as their own, not as instantiating the choices of higher-level decision 
makers.  Thus, if we understand the relations that define an organization in 
this relatively strong way, administrative agencies will routinely fail to 
count as state actors, despite passing the traditional state actor test. 
If we adopt a lower standard, we get the opposite problem.  Too many 
individuals qualify as state actors.  On this approach, an individual would 
count as part of an organization such that her actions are properly attributed 
to the organization, if the group’s decisionmaking process gave her the 
tools to act as she did.  Administrative agencies will certainly qualify on 
this standard. 
The problem is that almost every action taken by citizens will qualify.  
As Robert Hale argues, much of what we are able to do is possible because 
the law gives us property rights over resources, grants us exclusive access 
to goods, protects our rights to use such goods as we see fit, and permits us 
                                                          
 54.  See Murphy, supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 55.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).  
 56.  See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Ex-
pertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 470 (2007) (“The informational asymmetry that justifies the 
delegation in the first place makes it difficult for Congress, courts, or other overseers to monitor 
the agency.”); see also David B. Spence, Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling 
Away the Delegation Problem, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 199, 214 (1997) (arguing that 
politicians’ ability to understand and act upon policy choices is much more limited than formal 
political models suggests).  
 57.  See Spence, supra note 56, at 214. 
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to act.58  This is precisely what Tushnet and others have in mind when they 
hold that there is no region of social life that is conceptually private.59 
Take, for example, our barista.  Though not the holder of a traditional 
office, she would qualify under this standard.  We see this exact situation in 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.60  In that case, the Supreme Court 
found the Eagle Coffee Shop, a privately run restaurant, to be guilty of a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation when it refused to serve black custom-
ers.61  The coffee shop in question clearly would not qualify as a state actor 
under the stronger standard.  The Court found no evidence that lawmakers 
or other officials actively supervised the coffee shop or encouraged em-
ployees’ behavior.62  Yet the shop qualified as a state actor on the grounds 
that the land and buildings on which the shop operated (and for which the 
shop paid rent) were owned by the state, as were nearby convenient parking 
facilities.63  The Court thus found that the state gave the coffee shop the 
tools to act as it did. 
Intuition (1) and intuition (3) are thus in tension.  If we take the state’s 
status as an organization to require a meaningful link between the head and 
hands of the body politic—the sovereign’s choices and the behavior of so-
called members—institutions that qualify as state actors according to intui-
tion (3) will fail according to intuition (1).  If we adopt a looser notion of 
what it means for the state to be an organization, entities that fail according 
to intuition (3) will qualify according to intuition (1). 
2.  The State-as-Organization Is Not the State-as-Governor 
Lawyers and legal scholars are unlikely to find the above revelation 
surprising.  After all, the vast jurisprudence of the state action doctrine is in 
many ways set up to address the divergence between what strikes us as a 
traditional state actor and what our other intuitions would seem to imply 
should qualify.  But the tension between the idea of the state as an organiza-
tion, and the idea of the state as playing a special role, proves to be slightly 
more subtle. 
Part of the challenge lies in pinning down what role we think the state 
plays.  Everyone from philosophers to the man on the street is quite con-
vinced that the state enjoys unique powers and performs special tasks.  Yet 
                                                          
 58.  Hale, supra note 16, at 470.  
 59.  See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and 
a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779 (2004).  
 60.  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).  
 61.  Id. at 717.  
 62.  Id. at 723–724.  In describing the relationship between the state and the parking authority, 
the Court mentions only financial dealings involving rents and the upkeep and maintenance of the 
building.  Id.  
 63.  Id.   
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it proves quite difficult to resolve what people have in mind with any preci-
sion.  When pressed, people tend to resort to quite abstract statements—for 
example, Weber’s declaration that the state has a monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of coercive force.64  But it is obvious that most do not straightfor-
wardly believe these claims.  It is hard to believe anybody thinks I would be 
wrong to physically restrain Fred if he is beating his toddler.  But nobody 
thinks it follows that I must be a state agent.  And many of these references 
to the state as possessing such a monopoly prove quite circular or under-
theorized.65  Who has to have a monopoly on legitimate violence for us to 
say the state does? 
Courts provide markedly little guidance.  In fact, they have further 
confused the issue by suggesting that what appears to be the exact same 
act—the enforcement of a private racial covenant—is transformed in nature 
if enforced by a judge.66  Typically, courts resort to historical references, 
pointing to the fact that a particular behavior was a “traditional function of 
government,”67 or whether an entity exercises powers “traditionally exclu-
sively reserved to the state,”68 as if the mere history of who had performed 
an act could transfigure its nature.69  But this resort to history is inconsistent 
with our intuitions as to what makes the state unique.70  If we were to dis-
cover that only elected officials were traditionally allowed to wear brown 
belts, I doubt we would think that frozen yogurt purveyors counted as state 
actors if permission was expanded to them as well.  Instead, the direction of 
                                                          
 64.  See, e.g., GEORGE KLOSKO, POLITICAL OBLIGATION 9 (2005) (“In discussing the ‘state,’ 
I use the term to represent an institution that corresponds to Max Weber’s standard definition, an 
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 67.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (finding that a private 
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standard was unworkable.  469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).  See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-11, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: ARE SERVICE CONTRACTORS 
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causation seems to go the other way.  Ordinary intuitions suggest that acts 
have been historically reserved for these actors because of something spe-
cial about their nature.  It is this functional component that we think is cen-
tral to the state’s nature.  There is something unique about what states are 
able to do that makes them a state. 
One quick and dirty way to avoid this confusion is simply to pick a 
few roles generally associated with the state and show that they are per-
formed by actors who would not qualify as part of the state understood as 
an organization.  Here I will stick with something closer to the higher 
standard discussed in the last section, since under the lower standard—as 
we saw—all actors will count as part of the same organization. 
This is easy to do.  Consider, for example, two famous cases in which 
courts found institutions to qualify as state actors on the grounds that they 
exercised special types of power, Marsh v. Alabama71 and Terry v. Ad-
ams.72  Both cases address functions widely associated with states: manag-
ing a town and electing lawmakers, respectively.  Yet in neither case do the 
actors in question act as lawmakers’ agents, as an organizational view of the 
state requires. 
We encountered Marsh earlier.  The case dealt with a town, Chicka-
saw, Alabama, that was owned by a corporation, Gulf Shipbuilding.73  Gulf 
provided streets, police, and other typical accouterments of city life.74  
When a Jehovah’s Witness dispensed religious literature outside the post 
office, the company had her arrested for trespassing.75  The Court found 
Gulf’s behavior to violate the First Amendment—something only state ac-
tors can do—on the grounds that running the town constituted a public 
function.76  Since Gulf performed the role of a state, it could not violate 
constitutionally protected rights. 
In Terry, the Court reached a similar conclusion with regards to a pri-
vate association, the Jaybirds, that held what were known as “all-white” 
primaries in a Texas county.77  The “club” held a straw poll primary prior to 
the county’s formal election procedures.78  All qualified white voters (and 
only white voters) in the county were eligible to participate in the straw 
poll.  The poll used no public funds, candidates were not legally required to 
participate, and winners were not legally required to enter the formal party 
                                                          
 71.  326 U.S. 501 (1945). 
 72.  345 U.S. 461, 461 (1953). 
 73.  Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 506 (noting that “since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the 
public, and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation”).  
 77.  Terry, 345 U.S. at 470. 
 78.  Id. at 493. 
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primaries.79  In practice, however, the winner of the Jaybird primary was 
guaranteed to run unopposed in the Democratic Party primary, and thus—
since the district was heavily partisan—to win in the general election.80  
The Court found the Jaybirds’ behavior unconstitutional on the grounds that 
the association—though nominally private—was in fact a state actor be-
cause it performed a quintessentially public function.81  “The Jaybird prima-
ry,” Justice Black wrote, “has become an integral part, indeed the only ef-
fective part, of the elective process that determines who shall govern in the 
county.”82 
These cases are enough to show that our intuition that states are de-
fined by what they do is in tension with our sense that states are defined by 
how they are structured.  
I offer a more robust theory of the public function, one that—unlike 
the under-theorized historical account—is sensitive to all the different ways 
in which governments have been shaped across time, and all the different 
sorts of tasks lawmakers have undertaken.  To do this, I will step away from 
the law for a second into the realm of political philosophy. 
Scholars of political obligation and distributive justice provide insight 
into our intuition that states constitute a special role.  Loosely, they contend 
the following: there are certain goods everybody values—physical safety, 
public health, access to basic resources, and so on.83  These goods are com-
plex.  For them to be robustly available, many people’s behavior must com-
bine in the right way.  Welfare policy X might produce the right results 
when combined with housing policy Q, and welfare policy Y might do the 
same if combined with housing policy Z, but the conjunction of policy X 
and policy Z might not do so, and the same might be true of social norm A 
and B.  This kind of complicated harmonization is unlikely to spontaneous-
ly arise or reliably persist.  It requires active coordination.84 
I theorize that this coordination is the special function we believe is 
performed by the state.  Consistent with our normal views about coordina-
tion, the idea is that one source of decisionmaking—and only one source of 
decisionmaking—must have the ultimate authority to direct the patterns of 
behavior that collectively produce these goods.  If multiple sources of deci-
sionmaking have this kind of power, their directions might conflict, or fail 
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to align in the right way, disrupting the necessary coordination.  The state, 
we believe, is an organization.  As such, it is thought to have a single deci-
sionmaking process that ultimately controls how all of its member-parts be-
have, just as we discussed earlier.  Moreover, the state is believed to be an 
omnipotent organization, one whose decisionmaking process has the ca-
pacity to control all the behaviors of all the individuals and institutions sub-
ject to its power—such as the previously discussed monopoly on the legiti-
mate use of violence.85  As an organization with this sort of power, the state 
is uniquely able to actively oversee all the behaviors that play a part in 
bringing about these socially desirable goods.  This is the special role we 
attribute to the state.  Particular actions are exclusively reserved for state 
actors because they are necessary to the state’s ability to perform this kind 
of regulated coordination.  On these very grounds, the philosopher Jeremy 
Waldron argues that: 
[T]he fact that there is a state and that it is, for all practical pur-
poses, dominant and unchallenged in a territory will be sufficient 
[to make it the proper subject of political obligation].  This is the 
organization that deserves our support in the enterprise of doing 
justice if any organization does.86 
As I have just described it, the idea that the state is an organization, 
and the notion that the state performs the function of regulated coordina-
tion, are not in conflict.  Indeed, the assumption is that the state is able to 
provide this kind of coordination because it is an organization, and thus has 
a centralized decisionmaking process which, as a result of its assumed om-
nipotence, has the ability to oversee and control as necessary all those 
whose behavior shapes the production of desirable social goods. 
The problem is what emerged in our earlier discussion.  Understood as 
an organization, the state does not have this kind of all-encompassing pow-
er.  Furthermore, if it wants to actually achieve the desired outcomes, it 
cannot acquire such power.  Recall Justice Blackmun’s comments that in a 
complex society, replete with rapidly changing and highly technical prob-
lems, Congress “simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate pow-
er under broad general directives.”87  In saying this, Justice Blackmun rec-
ognized that no single decisionmaking process could effectively pay 
attention to what was done by all of the individuals and institutions who can 
influence social outcomes, much less understand what must be done to pro-
                                                          
 85.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 5 (1986) (distinguishing the state on the 
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 86.  Waldron, supra note 83, at 25. 
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duce the desired coordination in the vast array of highly complex policy 
arenas that play a part in the production of these goods.  If lawmakers want 
to have any chance of achieving the social outcome they want, they must 
allow a wide variety of loci of power and influence.  Not for nothing is the 
paradigm picture of a command and control economy an empty grocery 
shelf.  As Jan Kooiman writes, “[n]o single actor, public or private, has the 
knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic, and diver-
sified problems; no actor has an overview sufficient to make the needed in-
struments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to domi-
nate unilaterally.”88 
Indeed, even this picture can be misleading.  The way I have described 
it might leave the impression that lawmakers are letting other actors exer-
cise quasi-autonomous power.  That is at best partially true.  Certainly, 
lawmakers make conscious choices to delegate the ability to discretionarily 
exercise power to other actors.  An example is the FCC authorizing statute, 
which permits the agency to issue regulations “as public convenience, inter-
est or necessity require.”89  However, not all who exercise this kind of in-
fluence on the production of desirable social outcomes are consciously giv-
en this power by lawmakers.  Lawmakers do not always have the ability to 
exercise full control.  They often lack the necessary resources, knowledge, 
attention, and skills.90  If they want to achieve a desired outcome, they must 
rely on others’ knowledge and skills to do so.  It simply is not feasible to 
effectively centralize decisionmaking—or even functional oversight—over 
everything from the design of roads to the development of vaccinations.  
Even if lawmakers gave up trying to achieve any particular desirable out-
come and simply sought to exercise control, the reality is that, in practice, 
they would always share that power with other actors.  With so many com-
plicated issues in hand, influence from other sources sneaks in.  In practice, 
even so-called absolutist monarchs were forced to share power with other 
actors.  As Roger Mettam has noted, Louis XIV—the shining exemplar of 
centralized control—“lacked the independence of action which is implied in 
the word ‘absolutism.’”91  In reality, “[m]uch of government within the 
realm was always a dialogue between the crown and a series of local elites, 
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institutions and social groups . . . .  The king sought their co-operation but 
could never hope totally to dominate them.”92 
The reality is that no single decisionmaking process does—or could—
effectively oversee all the individuals and institutions whose behavior influ-
ences the production of desired social goods.  The idea of an organization 
undertaking regulated coordination is thus misleading.  Such coordination is 
indeed required,  but rather than being traceable to the decisions of any one 
organization, this coordination is achieved through the ongoing efforts of 
many interrelated but quasi-independent organizations who must actively 
work to align their behavior if we are to achieve the outcomes we desire.  
As Jody Freeman writes: 
[G]overnance [is] a set of negotiated relationships . . . . [P]olicy 
making, implementation, and enforcement is dynamic, nonhierar-
chical, and decentralized, envisioning give and take among public 
and private actors.  Information, expertise, and influence flow 
downward, from agency to private actors; upward, from private 
actor to agency; and horizontally, among public and private ac-
tors.93 
This explains why our intuitions are in tension.  If we think of the state 
as centrally an organization, we cannot think of it as uniquely engaging in 
the role of governance.  Since the process is so vast and complicated, there 
will always be other organizations—perhaps like Gulf Shipbuilding or the 
Jaybirds—that participate in regulated coordination, either formally or func-
tionally.94  If we define state actors by their status as part of the state quasi-
organization, we will be forced to leave these organizations out.  Converse-
ly, if we think of the state as the function of overseeing coordination neces-
sary to the production of social goods, we cannot think of it as simply one 
organization.  There will always be actors who play a part in this coordina-
tion but must be seen as a distinct quasi-autonomous agent, not merely a 
cog in a broader organization. These two intuitions are in conflict. 
3.  The State-as-Governor Is Not the Same as the State-as-Office 
This brings us to our final comparison—intuition (3), the state consists 
of certain traditionally recognized offices, and intuition (2), the state plays a 
special role.  Like the other intuitions we have discussed, these theories of 
the state prove incompatible. 
Once again, the quick and dirty approach makes this easily apparent.  
Our discussion so far has provided several examples of entities that perform 
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what strike us as public functions but do not hold traditional offices.  Gulf 
was a shipbuilding company; the Jaybirds a club.95  We need not look far 
for further examples.  Voluntary groups and privately funded associations 
do not fit our traditional notion of a government actor, but courts have 
found both to qualify as a state on the grounds that they perform govern-
ment functions.  In American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hy-
drolevel Corp., for example, the Supreme Court found the Society of Me-
chanical Engineers—a volunteer standard-setting organization—to count as 
part of the state because it is, “in reality an extra-governmental agency, 
which prescribes rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate com-
merce.”96  In Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants of Loui-
siana, the Fifth Circuit found the financially independent board of certified 
public accountants to be “functionally similar to a municipality” because it 
was performing a public function by regulating a profession.97 
I argued earlier that an interest in governance explains our sense that 
certain actions are unique public functions. Roughly, public functions are 
those necessary to the achievement of regulated coordination, ensuring pat-
terns of behavior align to produce desired social outcomes.  For all of the 
reasons discussed in the previous section, this role is performed by many 
actors who do not hold traditionally recognized government offices.98 This 
is certainly true formally.  Industry associations, financial institutions, labor 
unions, and others participate in the process of coordination when they en-
gage in negotiated rulemaking or audited self-regulation.99  It is also true 
when applied informally.  Because of their specialized information, focused 
attention, expertise, and resources, private standard-setting organizations, 
for example, play a central role in a wide variety of policy areas.  Often, 
their decisions are directly translated into law.  Even when such groups 
have no formal rulemaking power, their decisions often have the functional 
regulatory effect of law.  Many rulemakers are heavily dependent on the 
guidance of outside experts, such as these organizations.  Beyond this, a 
wide variety of so-called private groups—from credit agencies to media 
outlets—have the capacity to influence what happens on the ground direct-
ly.  They can influence social conditions in ways that those who occupy 
traditionally recognized government offices, like lawmakers or administra-
tive agents, lack the knowledge, capacity, or resources to prevent or control.  
In many cases, they can, in fact, constrain how these traditional government 
                                                          
 95.  Id. 
 96.  456 U.S. 556, 570 (1982) (quoting Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 
U.S. 457, 465 (1941)).  
 97.  139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998).  
 98.  See supra Part II.B.1-2. 
 99.  See Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory 
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1995); see also Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The 
Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 32, 33 n.1 (2000) 
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actors are able to behave.  For these very reasons, a frustrated James Car-
ville, advisor to President Clinton, once announced, “I used to think if there 
was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the President or the Pope or 
a .400 baseball hitter.  But now I want to come back as the bond market.  
You can intimidate everybody.”100 
Like our other theories of the state, intuitions (2) and (3) are thus in 
tension.  If we insist the state is uniquely associated with certain offices, we 
cannot say it uniquely governs.  Many individuals and institutions that do 
not occupy these offices play a part in regulated coordination.  If we think 
of the state as a distinctive role, we cannot say it is narrowly tied to these 
traditional offices. 
Indeed, we can see evidence of this tension in how courts have ad-
dressed the public function test.  In recent years, courts have narrowed this 
test, holding that entities qualify as state actors only if the action they per-
form has traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of state actors.101  We 
can read this restriction as an attempt to respond to critics who note precise-
ly what we have just described—that any search for the entities who per-
form the kinds of functions we associate with the state reveals many indi-
viduals and institutions who do not occupy traditionally recognized 
offices.102 
Adding this historical requirement forces the actors who qualify under 
each intuition to more closely align.  Many more of those who perform acts 
historically within the exclusive prerogative of state actors occupy offices 
historically recognized as part of the state.  But from the perspective that 
underlies the public function test—thinking of the state as performing a 
special role—this limitation is unwarranted.  The historical standing of the 
actors who perform a test may (questionably) be a decent heuristic for those 
who play a necessary role in governance.  However, as I argued earlier, our 
intuitions about the role of the state run in the other direction.103  We tend to 
think functions are reserved for state actors because the functions them-
selves are special, not the other way around.  The limitation thus does vio-
lence to our intuitions about the state’s nature. 
Indeed, limiting our sense of what behaviors constitute public func-
tions in this way would empty the category of many we associate most 
strongly with the state.  On this logic, for example, the Supreme Court 
found that guards in a privatized prison do not constitute state actors be-
cause at various times throughout history prisons have been managed by 
                                                          
 100.  David Wessel & Thomas Vogel, Market Watcher: Arcane World of Bonds Is Guide and 
Beacon to a Populist President—Rally Is Seen as Endorsement of Policy—and It Helps Economy 
as Rates Fall—But It Could Be Fickle Friend, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1993, at A1. 
 101.  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. 419 U.S. 345, 351, 352 (1974). 
 102.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 103.  See supra Part II.B.2.   
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private contractors in addition to governments themselves.104  With this rid-
er, running a prison is not a state action.  Such guards, however, wield pre-
cisely the sort of power most paradigmatically associated with the state—
the right to exercise coercive violence to enforce the law.  On any sensible 
reading, it would follow that the sense that the state performs a distinct role, 
and that it points to the occupants of traditional offices, would prove to be 
in conflict. 
III.  EXPLAINING THE WEAKNESS OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
Our intuitions about the state, it follows, are incompatible.  We can 
think of the state as an organization, we can think of it as a role, and we can 
think of it as a set of offices.  But we cannot think of it as all three.  What 
the state must consist of to qualify as the first intuition is inconsistent with 
what it must consist of to qualify as the second intuition, and both in turn 
are in tension with what it must be to make sense of the third.105  One insti-
tution cannot singlehandedly govern, and it cannot do so by traditional of-
fices alone.  If we cling to these intuitions as jointly necessary, we must 
conclude that there is no such thing as the state.  The concept is incoherent. 
Empirical social scientists have long recognized this incoherence.  As 
early as 1914, Norman Angell decried the habit of “thinking in States” as 
failing to capture the “true nature of that relation within the community,” 
and as leading to false conclusions.106  In using states as our tool to under-
stand politics, he argued, “we are not facing facts; that we proceed habitual-
ly upon assumptions which analysis does not support, that we are ignoring 
changes which have taken place, and basing our action daily upon concep-
tions which have become obsolete, upon unrealities, sometimes upon 
shams.”107  Arthur Bentley wrote in his 1908 treatise, The Process of Gov-
ernment, that “[t]he ‘idea of the state’ has been very prominent, no doubt, 
among the intellectual amusements of the past,” but found that, “as soon as 
it gets out of the pages of the lawbook or the political pamphlet, it is a pite-
ous, threadbare joke.  So long as there is plenty of firm earth under foot 
there is no advantage in trying to sail the clouds in a cartoonist’s airship.”108  
Regarding the idea that states should be considered distinct from other so-
cial organizations, he wrote, “a kindergarten acquaintance with the facts of 
government, as apart from the halos, the hero-worship, and other sensation-
alism, should suffice to put an end to any such approach to the subject.”109  
                                                          
 104.  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404–07 (1997).  
 105.  For a discussion of these intuitions, see supra Part II.B.3.  
 106.  NORMAN ANGELL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITY xxviii–xxix (1914).  
 107.  Id. at 7–8. 
 108.  ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES 
263–64 (1908). 
 109.  Id. at 264. 
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By 1938, the incoherence of the concept of the state was so widely 
acknowledged that George Sabine wrote in the Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences that the phrase “the State . . . commonly denotes no class of ob-
jects that can be identified exactly, and for the same reason it signifies no 
list of attributes which bears the sanctions of common usage.  The word 
must be defined more or less arbitrarily to meet the exigencies of the system 
of jurisprudence or political philosophy to which it occurs.”110 
Unfortunately, our discussion reveals that courts and legal scholars 
have been slower to pick up on this incoherence, or its consequences.111  
And consequences it has.  The revelation that the concept of the state is in-
coherent explains the force of the criticisms we have seen leveled at the 
state action doctrine.  Let us review these concerns. 
A.  Intelligibility Revisited 
Critics first challenged our ability to find a workable way of identify-
ing state actors.  They argued that there is an ever-growing array of tests 
purporting to do this work, each assessing a shifting assortment of charac-
teristics.112  Despite decades of effort, we seem unable to develop a con-
sistent method of classification. 
The discovery that the concept of the state itself is incoherent explains 
this failure.  Of course, we have not been able to establish a single test or 
set of features that can reliably distinguish state actors; there is no single 
thing that defines what it means to be a state.  Any test that satisfies one of 
our intuitions fails the others. 
B.  Purposelessness Revisited 
This incoherence equally makes sense of the worry that the doctrine is 
purposeless.  That concern is driven by the sense that the division between 
state and non-state actors tracks nothing of moral significance.  If that is 
true, we should hold both types of actors to the same standard. 
The incoherence of the state explains why this so often seems the case.  
Imagine that we have a reason to track the organization that is the state—
say, for example, we want to hold accountable everybody who bears re-
sponsibility for some act the organization undertook as a collective agent.113  
If we identified state actors by looking for those who played the role of the 
state or occupied a traditional office (a la intuitions (2) and (3)) the classifi-
                                                          
 110.  George Sabine, The State, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1934) (cited in 
JENS BARTELSON, THE CRITIQUE OF THE STATE 77 (2001)). 
 111.  They are not unique in this failure.  Elsewhere, I argue that political philosophers have 
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 112.  See supra Part I.A.  
 113.  See Avia Pasternak, Sharing the Costs of Political Injustices, 10 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 188 
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cation would have no value for our purpose.  Many of the actors the test 
would identify are not part of the relevant organization and thus would not 
bear such responsibility.  But our mistake would not be looking for “the 
state” per se.  Instead, because we lack a consistent notion of the state, we 
vacillate with regard to what we seek.  Since the occupants of the state qua 
role, and the state qua organization are not the same, identifying the former 
has no special value when we are trying to apply a moral principle applica-
ble only to the latter.  This leads us to believe the distinction has no signifi-
cance; this type of vacillation and attendant confusion drives our sense that 
the act of categorizing actors has no purpose. 
C.  Meaninglessness Revisited 
Finally, critics contend that the effort to distinguish state actors is 
meaningless because all action is state action.  So-called private actors are 
able to act as they do only because the state has developed background con-
ditions that make it possible for them to do so.114  We can now see that this 
criticism itself gains traction from the kind of confusion we discussed in 
Part II.B.  If lawmakers really were part of an organization that governed 
fully with the coordination of patterns of social behavior, then it would be 
true that anything done by so-called “private actors” consistent with the law 
would happen by their leave and thus constitute a state action.  If this were 
the case, Mark Tushnet would be correct in writing that, “the setting of each 
of the background entitlements is a result of state power that could have 
been exercised differently—that is, the result of policy and politics.”115 
Lawmakers, however, do not have that kind of power.  As we have 
seen, they often lack the knowledge or capacity to monitor, control, or un-
derstand what is being done with these background entitlements.  Perhaps 
background entitlements could be set differently.  But lawmakers are not 
always in a position to make this happen.  Differentiating between our dif-
ferent intuitions about the state allows us to draw meaningful distinctions 
between state and non-state actors.  There are certainly individuals and in-
stitutions that have the ability to make autonomous choices in ways the or-
ganization’s decisionmaking processes cannot effectively control or correct.  
If we think of the state as an organization (or an office), they are thus mean-
ingful non-state actions. 
                                                          
 114.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 265 (1992) (arguing 
that the government does not act only when it upsets existing distributions of rights and resources 
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The same is true if we think of the state as a role.  On that view, the 
state consists of those who influence regulated coordination.116  In contrast 
with the vision of a single organization ensuring coordination, this image 
allows us to recognize the fact that background conditions are often the 
product of decentralized, dynamic negotiations between many actors, each 
of whom exercise some influence, but none of whom exercise all influence.  
This disaggregation means that problems of coordination sneak back into 
the process of governance.  It therefore simply is not true that all of the 
background entitlements are the product of state power that could have been 
exercised differently.  Sometimes, these conditions are the result of interac-
tions that no institution or individual who played a part in governance were 
in a position to foresee or forestall.  It follows that we can meaningfully dis-
tinguish between those actions that are the result of policy choices that 
could reasonably have been exercised differently by governing agents, and 
those which are not.  The category of the non-state actor is not conceptually 
empty.  Our confused efforts to combine the three different traits we associ-
ate with the state have led us to overlook all the power that private actors 
exercise independent of state control, and thus to falsely presume there are 
no meaningful non-state actions. 
These explanations drive home that the incoherence of the concept of 
the state has real consequences.  Among other things, it explains why the 
state action doctrine is such a mess.  We have been unable to find an intelli-
gible, meaningful, purposeful way of differentiating state actors because 
there is nothing coherent in what it means to be a state, and nothing in prac-
tice that possesses all the characteristics we mistakenly presumed states to 
have. 
IV.  THE WAY FORWARD 
Where do we go from here?  One thing is clear.  We cannot solve our 
issues with the state action doctrine by trying to develop clearer tests, or by 
working to uncover the essence of the state or the principles that might ap-
ply to it.  Because the concept of the state is itself incoherent, such efforts 
will merely result in further confusion.  To get ourselves out of this mess, 
we need to think about the state—or the doctrine—differently. 
The easiest answer would seem to be that advocated by many legal 
scholars: just give up.117  If there is nothing coherent in what it means to be 
a state, it does not make sense to try to identify these actors, much less hold 
them to different legal requirements.  The effort to identify the state is 
                                                          
 116.  See Andrew Gamble, Economic Governance, in DEBATING GOVERNANCE: AUTHORITY, 
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merely, as J.A. Nicholson put it in 1928, “a source of great embarrassment 
and confusion”118  These critics argue that it is one we should stop attempt-
ing.  I want to dispute this move.  Instead, I think there is reason to rescue 
the state action doctrine—and the resources to do so in a way that avoids 
the serious criticisms rightly lobbied at the current approach.  In fact, I think 
we are closer to achieving this than we have realized. 
Our discussion above revealed three strongly held intuitions about the 
nature of the state: the state is an organization, a role, or a set of offices.  
Each of these intuitions point to a set of morally significant characteristics.  
Thus there is reason to identify those who qualify as state actors according 
to each of these intuitions, and reasons to hold them to different standards.  
Moreover, we can develop workable tests that allow us to do so. 
Of course—as we have seen—these characteristics do not point to the 
same actors.  But here is the key: that it is not a problem, it is a benefit.  We 
have long thought this incoherence concerning because we have mistakenly 
believed that there is some coherent entity called the “state” whose nature 
and identity we can clarify if only we work hard enough.  As I have shown, 
this belief is false.  The characteristics we have long associated with the 
state do not point to a single coherent set of actors and we should not expect 
they ever will. Yet if each of these clusters of features is morally signifi-
cant, this inconsistency is not troubling.  Rather than attempting to develop 
a single state action doctrine that somehow makes sense of all of these dis-
cordant features, we must instead develop several different state action doc-
trines, each tracking a distinct set of morally significant features.  Instead of 
attempting to reconcile these doctrines, we must work out the legal context 
in which each is relevant. 
A full defense of this view lies beyond a paper of this length.  What I 
do here is lay the groundwork for this argument.  To do so, I will reconsider 
each of the intuitions I discussed earlier.119  I will show that each vision of 
the state is associated with a set of features we can successfully track, that 
draw a meaningful division, and that point to individuals and institutions we 
have principled reason to grant different rights and responsibilities.  My de-
fense will necessarily be preliminary and promissory—more must be said 
about the moral reasons that explain our interest in these characteristics and 
to identify the contexts in which these concerns rightly subject an actor to 
different legal standards.  Still, my claims are sufficient to show why this 
new approach overcomes the criticism to which the current jurisprudential 
framework is rightly subject. 
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A.  The Organization 
Let us start with our first intuition, that the state is an organization.  
Organizations differ from mere aggregations of individuals because they 
possess a decisionmaking structure and a system of internal control that di-
rects how members behave.  As the sociologist Edgar Schein notes, “[a]n 
organization is the rational coordination of the activities of a number of 
people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, 
through division of labor or function, and through a hierarchy of authority 
and responsibility.”120  An angry mob and an army acting under orders may 
both destroy a city, but the behavior of the latter represents the intentional 
choice of a standing decision procedure, while the former is merely the ag-
gregate result of many people’s individual choices. 
Loosely, the scope of an organization is equivalent to the set of indi-
viduals who: (1) possess a set of mechanisms through which they make 
binding choices about courses of action in response to reasons; (2) effec-
tively enforce standards of conduct on individual members so as to bring 
about these choices, such that the behavior of members of the group can be 
appropriately said to reflect these binding choices; and (3) define roles that 
allow individuals to exercise certain powers and anticipate how other mem-
bers of the group will behave.121  The cashier at AMC theaters can truthful-
ly say that she is charging you twenty dollars for a ticket because AMC re-
quires it, not because she wants to—in a way that the kid bargaining with 
you to shovel your driveway cannot. 
Now we have a relatively clear way of distinguishing state actors: such 
actors are the group of people whose behavior can reasonably be said to re-
flect the choices of the same structured decisionmaking process—loosely, 
the lawmaking process—not their own independent choices, or those of a 
different set of decisionmaking mechanisms.  Although more can be said, 
this is enough to get a sense of how we might go about developing a work-
able test for identifying such actors.  Indeed, it is reasonable to think that a 
workable test such as the one set forth here is what courts that employ en-
tanglement tests have been working towards.122 
Our earlier discussion should make it clear that the distinction between 
organizational and non-organizational decisions is meaningful.  In practice, 
the decisionmaking process of any organizational structure—even a gov-
ernment’s—is limited.  As a result, many individuals and institutions are 
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able to make choices of their own accord—that is, choices that purportedly 
hierarchically superior decisionmaking mechanisms could not effectively 
prevent or override. 
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, this organizational status is 
morally significant.  We have principled reasons for taking account of who 
qualifies as acting on behalf of a particular organizational structure, includ-
ing the organizational structure we have associated with the state.  Much 
more needs to be said about these reasons than can be considered in the 
confines of this paper, but let me gesture towards a few of the reasons these 
characteristics prove significant. 
First, philosophers contend that organized groups—in contrast with 
less structured collections of persons or institutions—can be ascribed to a 
kind of collective agency.  Because the group can make reflective choices 
about its behavior as a group, we can hold it responsible for the choices it 
makes.  By extension, we can hold members of a group accountable for 
what they jointly bring about in ways that distinguish them from a mere col-
lective.123  This gives us reason to track the scope of the organization.  The 
boundaries of effective organizational control define the limits of this sort 
of responsibility. 
Second, as an agent, an organization can enter into moral relations—
making promises and being granted permissions.  This can give an organi-
zation special moral responsibilities and special rights.  If an organization 
makes a promise—to provide certain goods, to limit itself in certain ways, 
and so on—then those whose actions represent the organization are bound 
by that promise.  Conversely, if you give an organization permission to ex-
ercise a certain kind of power over you, those whose behavior stems from 
the organization’s decisionmaking promises have the right to wield the rel-
evant power in a way others do not—even if the result of the two actions is 
equivalent.  Some people have the view that governments have made clear 
promises, and that citizens have granted lawmakers this kind of special 
power over their lives.124  If this is true—and more must be done to show 
that—those who act on behalf of the state qua organization will enjoy moral 
rights other actors do not.125 
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Contra critics, it follows that we can meaningfully distinguish those 
whose actions instantiate the organization that is the state, and that we have 
(at least prima facie) reason to do so.  A test designed to track these features 
can overcome the criticisms that have dogged the state action doctrine. 
B.  The Role 
The same is true of the features associated with our second intuition, 
the state as a role.  In Part II.B.2, I developed a theory of the special powers 
and capacities that constitute this role.  Our sense that the state performs a 
special function, I argued, stems from our interest in governance, that is, 
our interest in the oversight required to coordinate our behaviors, policies, 
and practices to ensure they produce desirable social outcomes, such as 
physical safety, public health, and improved access to basic resources.126  
Our inquiry revealed that no single institution has the power to ensure this 
coordination. Instead, the achievement of these desirable conditions re-
quires ongoing negotiation between a wide array of quasi-independent ac-
tors, each of whom exercise meaningful influence. 
Once again, more empirical work must be done to define precisely the 
characteristics that give an actor that kind of influence.  But the above dis-
cussion suggests a first-pass test: in virtue of its resources, knowledge, 
skills, position, and formal or informal authority, does the institution or in-
dividual in question have the ability to meaningfully influence the extent or 
quality of these social goods in ways that other actors cannot easily over-
ride—or that it can anticipate they will not correct?  Though the claim re-
quires a great deal of fleshing out, this first pass points in the direction of a 
workable test, answering our concern about intelligibility. 
Such a test would also draw a meaningful distinction.  There are cer-
tainly actors who satisfy this standard and others who do not.  My local in-
dependent coffee shop, for example, means a great deal to me.  But it hardly 
has the ability to meaningfully influence the quality of my access to basic 
resources or physical security (as much as I love a good latte).  Nor does it 
play much role in determining the number of people who enjoy these goods.  
By contrast, Raytheon, one of the largest defense contractors in the 
world,127 HSBC holdings, one of the largest banks in the world,128 or the 
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Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (“SOCMA”), the trade 
association of the specialty chemical industry, may well exert this kind of 
power.129 
We have principled reason to hold actors with the ability to govern to 
special moral standards.  Once again, more work must be done to flesh out 
these reasons.  But the basic idea is simple.  As Uncle Ben once said to Spi-
derman, “With great power comes great responsibility.”130  Actors with the 
characteristics we have described exercise a special kind of power.  Conse-
quently, they are subject to unique moral restrictions.  To give just one ex-
ample, consider again my local coffee shop.  There are many things wrong 
if the shop refuses to serve me a sandwich because I am a woman.  Yet one 
wrong is not available to it.  The shop does not have the power to prevent 
me from accessing nutrition.  I can simply wander to the nearby dumpling 
shop.  By contrast, if lawmakers passed a law requiring such discrimination, 
or a local bureaucrat refused me my SNAP benefits on this basis,131 it might 
be difficult or impossible for me to access an alternative source.  It follows 
that groups with these characteristics give rise to distinct concerns. 
Like the characteristics associated with the state as an organization, 
those connected to the state as a role prove to satisfy our standard: they 
suggest a reason for identifying the actors with these traits, and point to-
wards a functional way of doing so. 
C.  The Office 
Our final intuition—and I suspect our most commonly employed—
proves the most elusive.  Recall that this intuition is that the state consists of 
certain traditionally recognized offices—judges, magistrates, elected offi-
cials, and so on.  It is easy to dismiss this sense as reflecting merely our (as 
it turns out) inaccurate heuristic for assessing who satisfies the standards 
described above.  But we can make a separate case for distinguishing the 
occupants of these offices, and subjecting them to special standards. 
It is far less clear what characteristics this intuition tracks than in our 
earlier cases.  The temptation is strong to presume there is some further 
theory that explains our sense that these offices are special—perhaps a vari-
ant of those we have already discussed.  Nonetheless, it is possible to imag-
                                                          
 129.  The Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates is the trade association for chemi-
cal producers, representing over 200 member companies and 2,000 manufacturing sites. SOCIETY 
OF CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS & AFFILIATES: OUR MEMBERS, 
http://www.socma.com/about/?articleID=4584 (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). 
 130.  Stan Lee, Amazing Fantasy #15 (Aug. 10, 1962). 
 131.  SNAP is the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, a food program operated by the 
United States Department of Agriculture that offers assistance to low-income individuals. See 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP), http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-
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ine a fairly workable test: assess what offices are consistently accepted as 
central to the state.132  There is clearly a meaningful category of actors who 
qualify and actors who do not. 
This leaves only the question of why this distinction might be of any 
significance.  Do we have any principled reason to identify these actors and 
hold them to special standards?  I can gesture towards at least two. 
First—rightly or wrongly—those who occupy these offices are thought 
to reflect the interests, choices, and values of the public as a whole.  They 
are widely perceived as speaking “in our name.”133  This gives them an ex-
pressive capacity others lack.  There is something meaningfully different 
about a judge mandating that you wear a “kick me” sign than a colleague 
taping it to your back.  The former action brands you as judged unequal by 
your community, while the latter is viewed as reflecting only the choices of 
a particular individual.  This gives the former an expressive force the latter 
cannot and will never attain—a power that is itself morally significant.  We 
have reasons to control what is “said” by traditional state officeholders in 
their official capacity that does not extend to other actors. 
This same capacity to be viewed as acting in our name gives such of-
ficeholders the ability to morally burden the general public.  The issue is as 
follows: if a person widely believed to be operating on your behalf and 
speaking in your voice does something wrong, you have a duty to make it 
clear that you do not wish the person to act in this way, and that you do not 
endorse what was done.  This relationship generates its own obligations.  A 
person who puts herself in a position to generate this kind of duty has a re-
sponsibility to account for those who will be burdened by her behavior, and 
to accept restrictions that might not apply to others who lack this standing. 
These two points suggest we have principled reason to track this fea-
ture as well.  Like the traits associated with our other intuitions, it passes 
our standard: there are distinct categories of actors who do and do not have 
these characteristics, we have a functional way of identifying them, and we 
have reason to do so. 
                                                          
 132.  Recall, for example, Lillian Bevier and John Harrison’s comment that:  
[A]ll participants in the debate over state action appear to assume that there are institu-
tions for collectively organized coercion, such as police forces and armies, and institu-
tions that make primary decisions about how that force is to be used . . . .  All also seem 
to assume that there are unproblematically private persons to whom state power can in a 
sense be delegated through the creation of private rights that will be coercively en-
forced.  Core examples of the latter include individuals as well as artificial persons with 
legal personality, such as corporations.   
BeVier & Harrison, supra note 23, at 1802.  
 133.  See ERIC BEERBOHM, IN OUR NAME: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY (2012).  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Paper suggests a very different way of approaching the state ac-
tion doctrine.  Each of our theories about the nature of the state proves to 
point to a different set of features.  Each cluster of characteristics is morally 
significant, distinguishing a set of actors we have reason to hold to special 
moral standards.  In each case, knowing who acts tells us something im-
portant about how to assess the behavior in question. 
It follows that we have reason to track those who qualify as state ac-
tors according to all of these standards.  If we were to pick just one of these 
clusters of characteristics and prioritize it as the account of what it is to be a 
state, we would lose something important: the capacity to point to a set of 
morally significant characteristics and—by extension—actors that have 
special moral standing.  This would only be exacerbated were we to give up 
on the doctrine altogether. 
This puts a very different spin on the state action doctrine’s acknowl-
edged messiness.  We have reason to hold on to three different state action 
tests, each tracking different features and identifying different actors.  The 
result will be inconsistent answers as to whether a particular actor qualifies 
as part of the state.  This has long seemed a problem—a sign that we were 
confused about what states are like. 
But as we now see it, this inconsistency is no longer troubling.  Alt-
hough talk of the state action doctrine’s inconsistency has long been tinged 
with the sense of failure, this inconsistency is now revealed as valuable.  
The three tests cannot be reconciled because there is no coherent thing that 
makes a state a state.  And they shouldn’t be reconciled because we have 
different reasons for wanting to track each of the clusters of characteristics 
these tests pick out. 
Legal scholars have long responded to this kind of inconsistency and 
lack of reconciliation by declaring the doctrine “a mess.”134  This Paper, 
however, has revealed that this inconsistency is not a sign of failure, or 
something we have reason to eliminate.  Instead, it reflects the fact that we 
have different reasons to track different traits, each of which have long been 
associated with the state.  This incoherence is not itself something we have 
reason to eliminate.  The source of our problem is not per se jurisprudential.  
Rather, the issue lies in our assumption that these divergent tests ought to 
be unified into a single doctrine.  Once we recognize this is not so, the task 
                                                          
 134.  Turner, supra note 12, at 281, 283; David Topel, Note, Union Shops State Action and the 
National Labor Relations Act, 101 YALE L.J. 1135, 1142 (1992) (suggesting that it is difficult to 
make sense of the state action doctrine); see also Joan Kante, Note, The Constitutionality of Red-
lining: The Potential for Holding Banks Liable as State Actors, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527, 
558 (1993) (suggesting that it is not possible to predict what standard courts will use when exam-
ining the state action doctrine).  
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that motivates the doctrine—that of identifying the actors who should be 
granted special rights and responsibilities—seems far more achievable. 
Much, of course, remains to be done.  I have only gestured towards a 
description of the moral reasons that give us an interest in the clusters of 
features that underlie our longstanding interest in the state.  Each of these 
reasons—and the characteristics whose values they explain—requires fur-
ther explication.  Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, we must work 
out what kinds of constitutional concerns connect to each of these clusters 
of characteristics.  What reason do we have to rely on one or another of 
these doctrines when addressing specific types of legal questions?  Answer-
ing such questions will prove challenging.  Our recognition that there is no 
such singular thing as “the state,” however, should allow us to approach this 
work with a lightness of heart that efforts to understand the state action doc-
trine have rarely seen.  Far from being a reason for despair, the incoherence 
and complexity that have long characterized the state action doctrine hints 
at a light that can lead us out of Charles Black’s “damp echoing cave.”135 
                                                          
 135.  Black, Jr., supra note 5, at 102. 
